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Abstract—Consider a practical scenario: an untrusted gateway is required to verify all the incoming information encrypted via an encryption scheme, while the sender does
not want to reveal any information about the plaintext and
the privileged user to the gateway. That is, the gateway
distributes the information to a predefined group of users and
only the privileged user can open the message. To solve this
problem, we need an access control mechanism to allow certain
specification of the access control policies while protecting
the users’ privacy. With this scenario in mind, we propose
the notion of verifiable and anonymous encryption where a
verification function is added to the ciphertext, which captures
the security requirements of the confidentiality of the plaintext
and the anonymity of the privileged user. We present two
specific constructions of our framework under the setting of
asymmetric bilinear pairings in this paper. Our first scheme is
proven confidential and anonymous under a weaker security
model in the random oracle model, and our second one is built
on the basis of a zero knowledge proof of knowledge under a
strong security game.
Keywords-Verification, Anonymity, Access control, Zeroknowledge proof of knowledge.

I. I NTRODUCTION
The distribution and availability of digital information in
modern life and work lead new opportunities for providing
support to the individuals. This ubiquity of information also
creates new challenges in the protection of both the provided
information and the privacy of its users, which requires the
access control mechanisms should allow some specification
of the access control policies and protect the privacy of the
users at the same time.
To address practical scenarios in which an untrusted
gateway is involved for verification in encryption systems,
we put forward the notion of verifiable and anonymous
encryption as our access control mechanism, which is a
three-party protocol enabling an outside sender to transmit a ciphertext to an inside user (i.e. this user is in a
group composed of a large number of users) under the
verification of gateway W (determines whether to broadcast
this ciphertext or not). Unlike general encryption schemes,
because of the involvement of an untrusted gateway W , in
this case, collusion attack maybe possible between gateway
W and the corrupted users: (1) gateway W may collude
with the corrupted users to obtain the message content; (2)
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gateway W may collude with the corrupted users to guess
the identity of the privileged user. All in all, a verifiable and
anonymous encryption system should maintain confidentiality, anonymity while preventing collusion attack between
gateway W and the corrupted users, such that a sender can
transmit information to an inside user under gateway W
securely.
In order to provide a verifiable and anonymous encryption
scheme, we design a secure framework for our problem. In
our model, when a sender, say Alice, wants to transmit a
message to an internal user, say Bob, she encrypts her message with a verifiable and anonymous encryption algorithm
to generate a ciphertext which is composed of two parts:
encryption of the message and verification of the receiver’s
identity. Gateway W checks whether Bob is an inside user
with the verification part while Bob decrypts the ciphertext
with the encryption part.
In our first construction, we make use of a trusted third
party KGC [2] to generate the partial private keys for the
users (i.e. the KGC does not have access to the private keys
of the users), and then allow the users to generate their
own (full) private keys (from partial private keys). Also, we
demand every user in the system to generate a trapdoor and
send it to gateway W through a public broadcast channel,
which assures the unlinkability between the users and the
trapdoors. Gateway W checks the validity of the trapdoors
with the public keys of the users, and maintains them
in a trapdoor list (without identity information). Once a
ciphertext comes in, gateway W checks it using the trapdoor
list storing on its side. Seemingly, our problem has been addressed well. However, in the above construction, regarding
the security reduction, on the one hand, the adversaries are
not allowed to issue the public key query on user IDi∗ , where
IDi∗ is the identity in the challenge phase. Nevertheless, this
limitation is a bit restrict such that it can only be applied in
some special circumstances. On the other hand, its security is
reduced in the random oracle model, which may be insecure
in some cases [17].
To overcome these drawbacks, we resort to zeroknowledge proof of knowledge [14] to hide the message
and the identity information of the privileged user, such that
the adversaries could be given both identities and public

keys of all the users while achieving the confidentiality of
the message content and the anonymity of the privileged
user. In our second construction, we use a trusted certificate
authority (CA) to issue certificates, which are actually the
signatures of the users’ public keys and identity information
generated by CA with its master key. Now the verification
part of the ciphertext is replaced by a signature based on a
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, which
in our case is consisted of the plaintext and the certificate of
the privileged user, and gateway W checks the validity of
this zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. The tough problem
here is how to generate the certificates for the users in
an efficient way under the setting of asymmetric bilinear
groups. Fortunately, we found that [1] has presented an
efficient structure-preserving signature in asymmetric bilinear maps, for which the proof is extractable and therefore
yields an efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of
knowledge.
Related Work. Verifiable encryption has the property that
the validity of ciphertext can be verified without knowledge
of private key, and it has been used to construct solutions for
fair exchange [3] [4], escrow schemes [19], signature sharing
schemes [12] and publicly verifiable secret sharing [22].
The concept of verifiable encryption was first introduced
by Stadler [22] with the cut-and-choose methodology in
the context of publicly verifiable sharing schemes in 1996.
Then, Asokan et al. [3] proposed a more general form
of verifiable encryption with perfect separability for the
purpose of fair exchange of signatures in 1998. Bao et
al. [4] gave a verifiable encryption scheme without using
the cut-and-choose methodology, but it failed to provide
semantic security [13]. Camenisch et al. [9] proposed an
anonymous verifiable encryption scheme which did not use
the cut-and-choose methodology in 2001, but the prover
needs to know the private key of the receiver. Camenisch
et al. [10] introduced a verifiable encryption system that
provides chosen ciphertext security and avoids inefficient
cut-and-choose proofs in 2003; however, it requires to use
Paillier encryption function [18].
The notion of zero-knowledge proof was put forward by
Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff in [14]. In a zero-knowledge
proof protocol, a prover convinces a verifier that a statement
is true, while the verifier learns nothing except the validity of
the assertion. A proof of knowledge [5] is a protocol where
the verifier is convinced that the prover knows a certain
quantity w satisfying some kinds of relation R with respect
to a commonly known string x. If this can be done in such
a way that the verifier learns nothing besides the validity
of the statement, this protocol is called a zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge (ZKPoK) protocol [14]. That is, in zeroknowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPoK) protocols, a prover
convinces a verifier that some statement is true, while the
verifier learns nothing except the validity of the statement.

Hitherto, various efficient ZKPoK protocols about knowledge of discrete logarithms and their relations have been
proposed [11] [8] [9] [10], of which some are used in the
anonymous systems to prove their possession of certificates
for authentication without revealing or certificates, and some
are turned into non-interactive form, called signature of
knowledge (SPK) [11].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II defines the algorithms and security requirements of a
verifiable and anonymous encryption system, and introduces
the generic bilinear group model and the complexity assumptions that our proof of security depends on. Section III
details our first verifiable and anonymous encryption scheme
in asymmetric bilinear maps, and proves its confidentiality
and anonymity under the random oracle model. Section IV
presents another construction on the basis of zero-knowledge
proof of knowledge, as well as its security, after pointing
a shortage of the security reduction of the verifiable and
anonymous encryption system in Section III. Section V
concludes our paper and leaves some open problems.
II. P RELIMINARIES
In this section, we first present a formal framework of
verifiable and anonymous encryption. Then we describe how
an adversary will be allowed to interfere in the protocol
with games between an adversary algorithm and a challenger
algorithm. Furthermore, we review the definitions of bilinear
pairings, and the complexity assumptions.
A. Definition
Let S = {ID1 , · · · , IDn } be the user set in the verifiable
and anonymous encryption system, where IDi (i ∈ {1,
· · · , n}) represents the identity information (name, student
ID, etc.) of user IDi . Our framework is specified by the
following algorithms.
• Setup(k) → (params, msk, (pkG , skG ), M, C):
Taking a security parameter k as input, this algorithm
outputs the common system parameters params, the
master key msk, the public key and private key pair
(pkG , skG ) for gateway W , the description of the
message space M and ciphertext space C.
Generally speaking, this algorithm is run by the KGC.
• Make-Partial-USKey(params, msk, IDi ) → pski :
Taking the common system parameters params, the
master key msk, and the identity information IDi as
input, this algorithm outputs a partial private key pski
for user IDi .
Generally speaking, this algorithm is run by the KGC
and its output is sent to user IDi through a confidential
and authentic channel.
• Set-USValue(params, IDi ) → xi : Taking the common
system parameters params, and the identity information IDi as input, this algorithm outputs a secret value
xi for user IDi .

Make-USKey(params, pski , xi ) → ski : Taking the
common system parameters params, the partial private
key pski , and the secret value xi as input, this algorithm
outputs a (complete) private key ski for user IDi .
• Make-UPKey(params, xi ) → pki : Taking the common
system parameters params, and the secret value xi as
input, this algorithm outputs a public key pki for user
IDi .
Both Make-USKey and Make-UPKey are run by user
IDi itself, after running Set-USValue, and they share
the same secret value xi . Separating them means that
there is no need for a temporal requirement on the
generation of public and private keys in the scheme.
Usually, user IDi is the only one in possession of
xi and ski , and xi will be chosen at random from a
suitable and large set.
• Make-Trapdoor(params, xi ) → Ti : Taking the common parameters params, and the secret value xi as
input, this algorithm outputs a trapdoor Ti for user IDi .
• Encrypt(params, IDi , pki , pkG , M ) → C: Taking
the common parameters params, the identity identity
IDi ∈ S with the corresponding public key pki , the
public key pkG of gateway W , and a message M ∈ GT
as input, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext C.
• Verify(params, LT , skG , C) → C: Taking the common system parameters params, the trapdoor Ti , the
private key skG of gateway W , and the ciphertext C
as input, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext C in case
of success, or ⊥ in case of failure.
• Decrypt(params, ski , C) → M : Taking the common
parameters params, the private key ski of user IDi ,
and the ciphertext C as input, this algorithm outputs a
message M in case of being a member of privileged
receivers, or ⊥ in case of being a member of nonprivileged receivers.
We require that a system is correct, meaning that for all
IDi ∈ S, if (params, msk, (pkG , skG ), M, C) ← Setup(k),
pski ← Make-Partial-USKey(params, msk, IDi ), xi ←
Set-USValue(params, IDi ), ski ← Make-USKey(params,
pski , xi ), pki ← Make-UPKey(params, xi ), Ti ←
Make-Trapdoor(params, xi ), C ← Encrypt(params, IDi ,
pki , pkG , M ), C ← Verify(params, LT , skG , C), then M
= Decrypt(params, ski , C).
•

B. Security Model
In our model, since KGC is a trusted third party, we do not
allow the adversaries to have access to master key, but we
allow them to request partial private keys, or private keys,
or both, for identities of their choices. The following is a
list of the queries that an adversary algorithm A against
verifiable and anonymous encryption may carry out. We
define a challenger algorithm B to respond to these queries.
1) Make-Partial-USKey for user IDi : Algorithm B responds by running algorithm Make-Partial-USKey to

generate the partial private key ski for user IDi .
2) Make-USKey for user IDi : Algorithm B responds by
running algorithm Make-USKey to generate the private key ski for user IDi (first running Set-USValue
for user IDi if necessary).
3) Make-UPKey for user IDi : We assume that public
keys are available to algorithm A. When receiving a
public key request for user IDi , algorithm B responds
by running algorithm Set-UPKey to generate the public key pki for user IDi (first running Set-USValue
for user IDi if necessary).
4) Make-Trapdoor for user IDi : Algorithm B responds
by running algorithm Make-Trapdoor to generate the
trapdoor Ti for user IDi .
Confidentiality and Anonymity. It is formalized by
the indistinguishability of two games, and the adversary
has to guess which plaintext and which identity has been
encrypted in the challenge ciphertext. Note that we provide
the adversary with the public and private key pair of gateway
W , the trapdoor list and private information of some unprivileged users, which models a collusion between gateway
W and corrupted users.
We define an anonymity and chosen plaintext attack
for verifiable and anonymous encryption to ensure the
confidentiality of the plaintext and the anonymity of the
privileged user, which we call ANON-IND-CPA security.
More precisely, confidentiality and anonymity are defined
using a game between an adversary algorithm A and a
challenger algorithm B that algorithm A cannot distinguish a
ciphertext decrypted to one plaintext under one identity from
a ciphertext decrypted to another plaintext under another
identity.
1) Initialization. Algorithm B runs Setup to obtain the
public parameter params and the master key msk.
Then, algorithm B generates the public and private
key pair (pkG , skG ) for gateway W . Also, algorithm B
generates the trapdoor list LT = {T1 , · · · , Tn }, which
stores the trapdoors of all the users in the system.
Algorithm B gives the public parameter params,
the public and private key pair (pkG , skG ), and the
trapdoor list LT to algorithm A while keeping the
master key msk to itself.
2) Query Phase 1. Algorithm A issues a sequence
of queries, each query being either a Make-PartialUSKey query, a Make-USKey query, a Make-UPKey
query, or a Make-Trapdoor query on IDi ∈ S. These
queries may be issued adaptively.
3) Challenge. When algorithm A decides that Phase 2
is over, it outputs two messages M0∗ , M1∗ ∈ M,
two users ID0∗ , ID1∗ ∈ S on which it wishes to
be challenged. The only constraint is that ID0∗ , ID1∗
did not appear in Phase 2. To generate the challenge
ciphertext, algorithm B chooses d, e ∈ {0, 1}, and runs

Encrypt on Md∗ , IDe∗ to obtain the ciphertext C ∗ . It
sends C ∗ as the ciphertext to algorithm A.
4) Query Phase 2. Algorithm A continues to adaptively issue Make-Partial-USKey queries, MakeUSKey queries, Make-UPKey queries, Make-Trapdoor
queries on IDi ∈ S \ {ID0∗ , ID1∗ }, as in Phase 1.
5) Guess. Algorithm A outputs its guess d0 , e0 ∈ {0, 1}
for d, e and wins the game if d = d0 and e = e0 .
We refer to such an adversary algorithm A as an ANONIND-CPA adversary. We define the advantage of the adversary algorithm A in Q
attacking a verifiable and anonymous encryption scheme
= (Setup, Make-Partial-USKey,
Set-USValue, Make-USKey, Make-UPKey, Make-Trapdoor,
Encrypt, Verify, Decrypt) as
AdvQ,A = |Pr[d = d0 ∧ e = e0 ] − 1/4|.
The probability is over the random bits used by the challenger and the adversary.
There is another stronger version of security, the ANONIND-CCA security, where the adversary is not only allowed
to issue the above queries adaptively, but also allowed to
issue decryption queries.
C. Computational Assumption
Let G and Ĝ be two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime
order q. Let g be a generator of G and ĝ be a generator of
Ĝ, we define ê : G × Ĝ → GT to be a bilinear map if it
has the following properties [6] [15] [16]:
1. Bilinear: for all g ∈ G, ĝ ∈ Ĝ and a, b ∈ Zq∗ , we have
ê(g a , ĝ b ) = ê(g, ĝ)ab .
2. Non-degenerate: ê(g, ĝ) 6= 1.
We say that (G, Ĝ) is a bilinear group if the group action
in (G, Ĝ) can be computed efficiently and there exists a
group GT and an efficiently computable bilinear map ê :
G × Ĝ → GT as above.
Decisional BDH. The decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(BDH) problem is that for any probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm, it is difficult to distinguish (g, g a , g c , ĝ, ĝ a , ĝ b ,
ê(g, ĝ)abc ) from (g, g a , g c , ĝ, ĝ a , ĝ b , Z), where g ∈ G,
ĝ ∈ Ĝ, Z ∈ GT , a, b, c ∈ Zq∗ are chosen independently and
uniformly at random.
Decisional DH. The decisional Diffie-Hellman (DH)
problem is that for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm, it is difficult to distinguish (g, g a , g c , g ac ) from (g,
g a , g c , Z), where g ∈ G, Z ∈ G, a, c ∈ Zq∗ are chosen
independently and uniformly at random.
III. P ROPOSED S CHEME
In this section, we give a secure verifiable and anonymous
encryption scheme based on the techniques in [2]. Besides,
we provide the security reduction for this scheme in the
random oracle model.

A. Description
Let S = {ID1 , · · · , IDn } be the recipient set in the
system. Let ê : G × Ĝ → GT be a bilinear map over
bilinear groups G, Ĝ of prime order q with generators
g ∈ G, ĝ ∈ Ĝ respectively. Our verifiable and anonymous
encryption scheme in asymmetric bilinear maps consists of
the following six algorithms.
• Setup(k): This algorithm takes a security parameter k
as input. It runs as follows.
1) Selects s, β ∈ Zq∗ and computes g1 = g s , g2 =
ĝ s , g3 = ĝ β .
2) Defines a hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Ĝ.
3) Chooses x ∈ Zq∗ uniformly at random and computes X = g x . It sets (X, x) as the public key
and private key pair for gateway W .
Thus, the common system parameters are params =
(g, g1 , ĝ, g2 , g3 , H1 ). The master key is msk = s ∈ Zq∗ .
The message space is M ∈ GT and the ciphertext space
is C ∈ GT .
• Make-Partial-USKey(params, msk, IDi ): This algorithm takes the common system parameters params,
the master key msk, and the identity information IDi
as input. It outputs pski = H1 (IDi )s as the partial
private key associated for user IDi .
• Set-Secret-USValue(params, IDi ): This algorithm
takes the common system parameters params, and an
identity IDi as input. It selects xi ∈ Zq∗ , and outputs
xi as the secret value for user IDi .
• Make-USKey(params, pski , xi ): This algorithm takes
the common system parameters params, the partial
private key pski , and the secret value xi as input. It
outputs a private key ski = pskixi = H1 (IDi )sxi for
user IDi .
• Make-UPKey(params, xi ): This algorithm takes the
common system parameters params, and the secret
value xi as input. It outputs a public key pki = (Xi , Yi )
for user IDi , where Xi = g xi and Yi = g1xi = g sxi .
Note that the validity of the public key pki can be
checked by the equation ê(Xi , g2 ) = ê(Yi , ĝ).
• Make-Trapdoor(params, xi ): This algorithm takes the
common system parameters params, and the secret
value xi as input. It outputs a trapdoor Ti = (X̂i , Ŷi )
for user IDi , where X̂i = ĝ xi and Ŷi = g2xi = ĝ sxi .
Note that gateway W can check the validity of Ti by the
equations ê(Xi , ĝ) = ê(g, X̂i ) and ê(Yi , ĝ) = ê(g, Ŷi ),
but it has no idea about user IDi and the corresponding
trapdoor Ti . We assume that gateway W stores all Ti
in a trapdoor list LT .
• Encrypt(params, IDi , pki , pkG , M ): This algorithm
takes the common parameters params, the identity
information IDi ∈ S with the corresponding public
key pki = (Xi , Yi ), the public key pkG of gateway W ,
and a message M ∈ GT as input. It runs as follows.

1) Chooses r ∈ Zq∗ , computes C1 = g r and
C2 = M · ê(Yi , H1 (IDi ))r ,
C3 = ê(X, g3 )r · ê(Yi , ĝ)r .

•

•

2) Outputs the ciphertext C = (C1 , C2 , C3 ).
Verify(params, LT , skG , C): This algorithm takes the
common parameters params, the trapdoor list LT , the
private key skG of gateway W , and the ciphertext C
as input. It parses the ciphertext C as (C1 , C2 , C3 ),
and checks whether ê(g1 , X̂i ) = ê(g, Ŷi ) and C3 =
ê(C1 , g3 )x · ê(C1 , Ŷi ). If both of the two equations
hold, it outputs the ciphertext C. Otherwise, it outputs
a failure symbol ⊥.
Decrypt(params, ski , C): This algorithm takes the
common system parameters params, the private key
ski of user IDi , and the ciphertext C as input. It
outputs M = C2 /ê(C1 , ski ) = C2 /ê(C1 , H1 (IDi )sxi )
or a failure symbol ⊥.

Our construction also achieves traceability, i.e. the PKG can
reveal the identities of privileged users if necessary.
•

•

Query-Trace(params, C): This algorithm takes the
common system parameters params, and the ciphertext
C as input. It outputs a trapdoor Ti via the Verify
algorithm.
Trace(params, pki , pski , Ti ): This algorithm takes
the common parameters params, the public key pki ,
the partial private key pski , and the trapdoor Ti
as input. It checks whether ê(g, Ŷi ) = ê(Yi , ĝ) and
ê(Xi , H1 (IDi )s ) = ê(Yi , H1 (IDi )) hold. If such IDi
is found, it outputs IDi . Otherwise, it outputs a failure
symbol ⊥.

B. Security Analysis
We present the security reduction of our verifiable and
anonymous encryption scheme by showing that it is confidential and anonymous under the Decisional BDH assumption in the random oracle model.
Theorem 1: The above scheme is confidential and anonymous in the random oracle model assuming that the Decisional BDH assumption holds in (G, Ĝ).
Proof. Suppose there exists an algorithm A breaks the
confidentiality and anonymity of our verifiable and anonymous scheme. Thus, we construct an algorithm B that solves
the Decisional BDH problem, which is given as input a
random tuple (g, g a , g c , ĝ, ĝ a , ĝ b , Z), and outputs 1 (Z
is ê(g, ĝ)abc ) or 0 (Z is a random element in GT ).
Initialization. To generate the system parameters, algorithm B runs as follows.
•

Sets g1 = g a , g2 = ĝ a , g3 = ĝ b , and outputs params
= (g, g1 , ĝ, g2 , g3 , H1 ) as the public parameter, where
H1 is a random oracle controlled by algorithm B.

Chooses x ∈ Zp∗ uniformly at random and computes
X = g x . It outputs (pkG , skG ) = (X, x) as the public
and private key pair of gateway W .
∗
• For each user IDi ∈ S, chooses xi ∈ Zq , outputs Ti
xi
xi
= (X̂i , Ŷi ) = (ĝ , g2 ) as a trapdoor.
Algorithm B sends params, (pkG , skG ) and the trapdoor
list LT = {T1 , · · · , Tn } to algorithm A.
H1 -queries. At any time algorithm A can query the random oracle on IDi . To respond to these queries, algorithm B
maintains a list LH of tuples (IDi , H1 (IDi ), ri , xi , pski ,
ski , pki , Ti ) which is initially empty. When algorithm A
issues a hash query on identity IDi , if (IDi , ri ) already
exists in the list LH , algorithm B responds with H1 (IDi );
otherwise, algorithm B chooses ri ∈ Zq∗ , outputs H1 (IDi )
= g3ri , and completes the list LH with (IDi , g3ri , ri , ·, ·, ·,
·, ·).
Phase 1. Algorithm A queries IDi ∈ S to a series of
oracles, each of which is either Make-Partial-USKey, MakeUSKey, Make-UPKey, or Make-Trapdoor.
• Make-Partial-USKey: If (IDi , ri , pski ) already exists
in the list LH , algorithm B responds with pski = g1ri .
Otherwise, algorithm B chooses ri ∈ Zq∗ , outputs pski
= g1ri , and completes the list LH with (IDi , ·, ri , ·,
pski , ·, ·, ·). To see pski is a correct partial private key
with respect to IDi . Let ri0 = ri /b, thus we have that
ar 0
r0
pski = g1ri = g3 i = (g3i )a = H1 (IDi )a .
• Make-USKey: If (IDi , ri , xi , ski ) already exists in
the list LH , algorithm B responds with ski = g1ri xi .
Otherwise, algorithm B chooses ri , xi ∈ Zq∗ , outputs
ski = g1ri xi , and completes the list LH with (IDi , ·,
ri , xi , ·, ski , ·, ·). To see ski is a correct private key
with respect to IDi . Let ri0 = ri /b, thus we have that
ar 0
ski = g1ri xi = (g3 i )xi = H1 (IDi )axi .
• Make-UPKey: If (IDi , xi , pki ) already exists in the
list LH , algorithm B responds with pki = (Xi , Yi ) =
(g xi , g1xi ). Otherwise, algorithm B chooses xi ∈ Zq∗ ,
outputs pki = (Xi , Yi ) = (g xi , g1xi ), and completes the
list LH with (IDi , ·, ri , xi , ·, ·, pki , ·).
• Make-Trapdoor: If (IDi , xi , Ti ) already exists in the
list LH , algorithm B responds with Ti = (X̂i , Ŷi ) =
(ĝ xi , g2xi ). Otherwise, algorithm B chooses xi ∈ Zq∗ ,
outputs Ti = (X̂i , Ŷi ) = (ĝ xi , g2xi ), and completes the
list LH with (IDi , ·, ·, xi , ·, ·, ·, Ti ).
Challenge. Algorithm A outputs utputs two messages
M0∗ , M1∗ ∈ GT , and two users ID0∗ , ID1∗ ∈ S, where ID0∗ ,
ID1∗ did not appeared in Phase 2. Algorithm B executes as
follows.
∗
• Responds to H1 -queries to obtain ri , for i ∈ {0, 1}.
∗
r
Let (IDi∗ , g3i , ri∗ , ·, ·, ·, ·, ·) be the corresponding tuple
on the list LH .
∗
c
• Selects d, e ∈ {0, 1}, sets C1 = g , and computes
•

C2∗ = Md∗ · Z,

∗

C3∗ = ê(g c , g3 )x · ê(g c , g2 )xe ,

where x∗e ∈ {x∗0 , x∗1 }.
Outputs the challenge ciphertext C ∗ = (C1∗ , C2∗ , C3∗ ).
To see this, let x∗e = 1/re∗ , we have that

•

∗

scheme with a stronger security in which the adversaries
could query the public keys and the certificates of all the
users in the system.

∗

C2∗ = Md∗ · Z = Md∗ · ê(g a·xe , ĝ b·re )c
= Md∗ · ê(Ye∗ , H1 (IDe∗ ))c ,
∗

C3∗ = ê(g c , g3 )x · ê(g c , g2 )xe
∗

= ê(X, g3 )c · ê(g a·xe , ĝ)c
= ê(X, g3 )c · ê(Ye∗ , ĝ)c .
Hence, when Z equals ê(g, ĝ)abc , then C ∗ is a valid
encryption of Md∗ of IDe∗ chosen by algorithm A. On the
other hand, when Z is uniform and independent in GT , then
C ∗ is independent of γ in the view of algorithm A.
Phase 2. Algorithm A continues to adaptively query
IDi ∈ S \ {ID0∗ , ID1∗ } to oracles Make-Partial-USKey,
Make-USKey, Make-UPKey, or Make-Trapdoor. Algorithm
B responds as in Phase 1.
Guess. Finally, algorithm A outputs d0 , e0 ∈ {0, 1}. If
d = d0 and e = e0 , algorithm B outputs 1 meaning algorithm
A wins the game. Otherwise, algorithm B outputs 0.
Let  be the advantage that algorithm A breaks the
confidentiality of the above game. We can see that if
Z = ê(g, ĝ)abc , the simulation is exactly the same as the
real attack, and algorithm A will output d0 = d and e0 = e
with probability 1/4+. Else, if Z is uniformly random, then
algorithm A’s advantage is nil and thus output d0 = d and
e0 = e with probability 1/4. Thus, we have that algorithm
B’s probability in solving the decisional BDH problem is

A. Construction
In this construction, we use a trusted certificate authority
(CA) to issue certificates, which actually are signatures of
the users’ public keys generated by CA with its master key,
for users. Note that if a user accidentally reveals its secret
key or an attacker actively compromises it, the user itself
may request revocation of its certificate. Alternatively, the
user’s organization may request revocation if the user leaves
the company or changes position and is no longer entitled
to use the key.
Now in our verifiable and anonymous encryption system
under the setting of asymmetric bilinear maps, the public
keys and the identity information of the users in the system
might be made available to any sender. To encrypt a message
M to user IDi , the sender makes use of its public key pki
to compute a ciphertext Ci , and generates a signature of
(Certi , Ci ) based on a proof of knowledge in [14], where
Certi is the certificate of user IDi .
Let S = {ID1 , · · · , IDn } be the recipient set in the
system. Let ê : G × H → GH be a bilinear map over bilinear
groups G, H of prime order q with generators g ∈ G, h ∈ H
respectively. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → Zq∗ be a collision resistant
hash function. Our verifiable and anonymous encryption
scheme consists of the following six algorithms.
•

Pr[A(g, g a , g c , ĝ, ĝ a , ĝ b , Z)] = 1/2 · (1/4 + ) + 1/2 · 1/4
= 1/4 + /2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
IND-CCA2 Secure Scheme. The result of Boneh and Katz
[7] can be applied to the above ANON-IND-CPA secure
verifiable and anonymous encryption scheme, thus we can
obtain a verifiable and anonymous encryption scheme that
is provably ANON-IND-CCA secure in random oracle by
just making MACi = H(IDi k M k C) as the addition to
the ciphertext.

•

IV. D ISCUSSIONS
In the security proof of the above scheme, the adversaries
are not allowed to issue the public key query on user IDi∗
where IDi∗ is the identity in the challenge phase. Otherwise,
the vicious users in the system can easily obtain the identity
of the privileged user when colluding with the untrusted
gateway W . To some extent, this constraint is not very
reasonable, as in most cases, the users are required to
publicize both their identities and public keys on a public
bulletin. That is, this system cannot be widely used in
practical environment. In this section, we propose a new

•

Setup(k): This algorithm takes a security parameter k as
input. It chooses u, v, w, z ∈ Zq∗ and computes U = g u ,
V = hv , W = hw , Z = hz . Thus, the common system
parameters are params = (g, h). The master secret key
is msk = (u, v, w, z) ∈ Zq∗ and the master public key
is mpk = (U , V , W , Z). The message space is M ∈ G
and the ciphertext space is C ∈ G.
Usually, this algorithm is run by the CA.
Make-UKey(params, IDi ): This algorithm takes the
common system parameters params, and the identity
information IDi ∈ H as input. It chooses xi ∈ Zq∗ ,
and computes Yi = g xi . It outputs a public and private
key pair (pki , ski ) = (Yi , xi ) for user IDi .
Usually, this algorithm is run by user IDi .
Certificate(params, IDi , pki , msk): This algorithm
takes the common parameters params, the identity
information IDi , the public key pki = Yi , and the
master secret key msk = (u, v, w, z) as input. It
chooses s ∈ Zq∗ , and computes
1

Ri = g s , Si = g z−sv Yi −w , Ti = (h · IDi −u ) s .
It outputs Certi = (Ri , Si , Ti ) as a certificate for user
IDi .
Usually, this algorithm is run by the CA. Note that
here we use the optimal structure-preserving signature

•

proposed in [1], which is very efficient in asymmetric
Usually, this algorithm is run by any sender who is
bilinear groups.
given pki and Certi of the users in the system.
Encrypt(params, pki , Certi , M ): This algorithm takes
• Verify(params, mpk, C): This algorithm takes the
the common parameters params, the public key pki =
common parameters params, the master public key
Yi , the certificate Certi , and a message M ∈ M as
mpk, and the ciphertext C as input. It parses the
input. It runs as follows.
ciphertext C as (C1 , C2 , C3 ), and checks the validity
of C3 .
1) Chooses r ∈ Zq∗ , and computes C1 = g r , C2 =
r
– Computes
M · Yi .
S ,h)ê(AY ,W )
2) Generates a signature for (Certi , C1 , C2 ) based
,
B1 = ê(BR ,V )ê(B
ê(g,Z)
ê(U,BD )ê(BR ,BT )
on the zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, which
B2 =
,
ê(g,h)
in fact is based on the non-interactive version of
Er = C1c g dr , E0 = Ac0 g1d0 g2dY ,
the Schnorr’s proof system presented in [20], [21].
r d3 dM
r d2 d3
E1 = A−d
g1 g2 , E2 = ( ACM2 )c A−d
0
Y g1 g1 ,
– Chooses β0 , β1 , βY , βM , βR , βS , βT , βD ∈ Zq∗ ,
F0 = B0c hd11 hd2T , F1 = B0−dR hd14 hd25 ,
g1 , g2 ∈ G and h1 , h2 ∈ H, and computes
F2 = B1c ê(g1 , W )dY ê(g, V )dR ê(g, h)dS ,
A0 = g1β0 g2βY , AM = M · g1βM ,
F3 = B2c ê(U, h)dD ê(BR , h1 )dT ê(g, BT )dR ê(g, h1 )d5 .
AY = Yi · g1βY , B0 = hβ1 1 hβ2 T ,
– If c = H(C1 , C2 , Er , E0 , E1 , E2 , F0 , F1 , F2 , F3 ), it
BR = Ri · g βR , BS = Si · g βS ,
βT
βD
outputs the ciphertext C. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
BT = Ti · h1 , BD = IDi · g .
Usually, this algorithm is run by gateway W .
– Chooses K0 , K1 , K2 , K3 , K4 , K5 , KY , KM ,
•
Decrypt(params, ski , C): This algorithm takes the
KR , KS , KT , KD , Kr ∈ Zq∗ , and computes
common system parameters params, the private key
Er = g Kr , E0 = g1K0 g2KY ,
ski of user IDi , and the ciphertext C as input. It
r K2 K3
r K3 KM
g1 g1 ,
E1 = A−K
g1 g2 , E2 = A−K
0
Y
outputs M = C2 · C1−xi or a failure symbol ⊥.
−KR K4 K5
1 KT
F0 = hK
h
,
F
=
B
h
h
,
1
1
2
1
1
2
Usually, this algorithm is run by user IDi .
F2 = ê(g1 , W )KY ê(g, V )KR ê(g, h)KS ,
F3 = ê(U, h)KD ê(BR , h1 )KT ê(g, BT )KR ê(g, h1 )KT . B. Security Proof
– Computes
Theorem 2: The above scheme is ANON-IND-CCA sec = H(C1 , C2 , Er , E0 , E1 , E2 , F0 , F1 , F2 , F3 ),
cure assuming that the Decisional DH assumption holds in
dr = Kr − cr, d0 = K0 − cβ0 ,
G and SPK is a secure zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
d1 = K1 − cβ1 , d2 = K2 − cβ0 r,
system.
d3 = K3 − cβY r, d4 = K4 − cβ1 βR ,
Proof. Given a ciphertext C ∗ = (C1∗ , C2∗ , C3∗ ), under
d5 = K5 − cβT βR , dY = KY − cβY ,
the Decisional DH assumption, it is clear that algorithm A
dM = KM − cβM , dR = KR − cβR ,
cannot obtain the plaintext M and the public key Yi used in
dS = KS − cβS , dT = KT − cβT ,
C ∗ from the encryption part (C1∗ , C2∗ ). On the other hand,
dD = KD − cβD .
because of the security properties on SPK [11], algorithm
A has negligible probability to learn the identity of the
Thus, we obtain C3 , a signature of knowledge M
privileged user from the verification part C3∗ . Also, C3∗ can
= (Certi , C1 , C2 ) as
 be regarded as an one-time signature scheme built from a
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proof of knowledge system such that achieves ANON-IND
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proof of knowledge scheme, algorithm A acquires nothing
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even it colludes with CA. We omitted the details here.
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V. C ONCLUSIONS AND O PEN P ROBLEMS
1 αT
1 = B0−βR hα
α0 , α1 , βY ,
1 h2 ∧
(M). In this paper, we introduce a new primitive called veriSPK
ê(BR ,V )ê(BS ,h)ê(AY ,W )
βD , βT ,




ê(g,Z)




fiable and anonymous encryption, and propose two specific
β
α
,
α
)
Y


T
Y
=
ê(g,
W
)






schemes in the setting of asymmetric bilinear maps, where
βR
βS


ê(g, V ) ê(g, h)






we authorize an untrusted gateway W to verify whether the
ê(U,BD )ê(BR ,BT )




∧
=


ê(g,h)


privileged user of an outside ciphertext is an inside member,



ê(U, h)βD ê(BR , h1 )βT 




but gateway W could not learn the content of the message


ê(g, BT )βR ê(g, h1 )αT
and the identity information of the privileged user.
In our first verifiable and anonymous encryption scheme
where α0 = β0 · r, αY = βY · r, α1 = β1 · βR ,
in asymmetric bilinear pairings, gateway W stores the trapαT = βT · βR .
doors generated by the users in the system in a trapdoor
3) Outputs the ciphertext C = (C1 , C2 , C3 ).

list. When it receives an outside ciphertext, it decides to
broadcast it or not by verifying this ciphertext with the
trapdoor list. Seemingly, it solves our problem; however,
in this construction, the adversaries are not allowed to issue
a public key query on IDi∗ where IDi∗ is the identity in
the challenge phase, which is too strict to be widely applied
in the real world, where the users are usually required to
publicize their identity information and the corresponding
public keys.
In our second verifiable and anonymous encryption
scheme, we consider making use of a zero-knowledge proof
of knowledge to generate a signature for verification in our
second scheme, thus the scheme could be secure when the
adversaries are given both the identity information and the
public keys of all the users in the system. Though zeroknowledge proof of knowledge is very useful to achieve
verifiable and anonymous encryption, we can see that it is
still not very efficient even the structure of the certificates in
our system are optimal structure-preserving in asymmetric
bilinear maps.
In both our verifiable and anonymous encryption schemes,
only one privileged user is allowed in a protocol run. Hence,
we leave as an open problem the solution of building
efficient verifiable and anonymous broadcast encryption systems, which are secure with short size or constant size of
the ciphertext in the random oracle model or the standard
model.
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